If two countries experience similar cycles, loss in monetary sovereignty following currency union may not be severe. Analysis of cyclical similarity is frequently carried out at the overall industry level, then interpreted with reference to regional industrial structures. By contrast, this paper explicitly incorporates regional industry structure into an examination of Australasian cycles. Since 1991, NZ and Australasian cycles have been highly correlated, but there is little evidence that the NZ cycle has been "caused" by Australian regional or industry cycles. We test whether the NZDAUD exchange rate has insulated NZ from Australian shocks, but find it has not played a major buffering role in response to Australian industry shocks (including mining shocks). Instead, the strongest impacts on the NZDAUD stem from the NZ cycle. An important loss of monetary sovereignty under currency union may therefore arise in response to NZ-specific shocks.
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Introduction
This paper addresses issues that are central to consideration of potential currency union between Australia and New Zealand. The two countries (together termed 'Australasia') currently have separate freely floating exchange rates. They have substantial trade with each other and so there are microeconomic (transactions cost) advantages of their forming a currency union (Grimes et al, 2000) . 1 The price signalling mechanism could be enhanced if prices and wages were set in a single currency. In addition, a currency union may deliver capital market advantages arising from greater trading depth of the common currency.
A common currency would, however, mean some loss in monetary sovereignty for the two countries since exchange rate adjustment would be spread over a single currency rather than across two currencies. In most circumstances, the smaller country (New Zealand) would have more to lose in terms of monetary sovereignty since the common currency would most likely react to region-wide developments that would be dominated by the much larger country (Australia). If the two countries experience similar shocks and have similar economic cycles, the loss in monetary sovereignty may not be severe; common exchange rate adjustment could then be as suitable for the smaller country as for the larger country. If, however, the sources of shocks and the resulting cycles are quite different, the loss in monetary sovereignty may have major consequences for the small country. Traditional currency union analysis (Mundell, 1961) suggests that 1 Australia is New Zealand's largest trading partner while New Zealand is one of Australia's top five trading partners. They have a comprehensive free trade agreement, free labour flows and are harmonizing other aspects of economic regulation (Coleman, 1999; Grimes et al, 2000; Lloyd, 2002; Goddard, 2002). this is especially the case in the absence of fiscal transfers between countries within the currency union, as is the situation in Australasia.
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Analysis of cyclical similarity across regions is frequently carried out at the overall industry level. 3 Regional cyclical differences are then often interpreted, outside of the formal analysis, with reference to industrial structure differences across regions. The main contribution of this paper is to examine regional cyclical issues explicitly incorporating the regional industry structure into the analysis.
Examination of shock transmission at this level gives considerably greater insights into the sources of regional shocks. In turn, this examination assists analysis of the costs that are likely to be involved with the loss of an independent currency. Grimes (2004) has examined similarities in trend employment across industries within Australasia, where Australasia is divided into nine regions: New Zealand plus Australia's six states and two territories. On most measures, New Zealand lies between the five large states and Tasmania in terms of structural similarities with other regions; the two territories are outliers. This trend information helps to interpret the cyclical results contained in this paper.
Our methods build on some of those used by Kouparitsas (2001 Kouparitsas ( , 2002 who analyses regional business cycle characteristics across US regions, albeit at the overall industry level. He uses both correlation analysis and structural vector autoregression (SVAR) techniques. His correlation approach examines: (a) contemporaneous correlation of business cycles across regions; and (b) 1-period 2 For a contrary view, see Kempf and Cooper (2004) , who argue that a currency union is welfareimproving no matter what the correlation of shocks even without inter-regional fiscal transfers, provided individual country fiscal policy can be used for stabilization purposes. 3 For Australasian examples, see Dixon and Shepherd (2001) , Hall et al (1998) , Hargreaves and McDermott (1999) , Grimes et al (2000) , Haug (2001) , Bjorksten (2001) , Bjorksten et al (2004) .
lead/lag correlations of business cycles across regions. If the lead/lag correlations exceed the corresponding contemporaneous correlations, there is prima facie evidence of cycle spillovers from one region to another. Kouparitsas interprets the transmission of regional cycles with reference to regional industry characteristics, but he does not use these characteristics to derive the cycles.
4 Beine and Coulombe (2003) , who examine whether individual Canadian provinces should share a common currency with the United States, is another analysis performed at the overall industry level. 5 Nevertheless, it has some features on which we base aspects of our analysis. They choose not to use structural VAR methods, noting that while these methods have strengths, they rely for their interpretation on identification assumptions that are to some extent arbitrary. Instead, the main methodological approach adopted by Beine and Coulombe is to examine the size and significance of quarterly GDP gap correlations between Canadian provinces and the US. They also use quarterly employment data to compare cyclical positions of Canadian provinces and certain US states.
Beine and Coulombe note that the correlation approach does not allow them to distinguish between different types of disturbances. Further, by virtue of their application to Canadian provinces relative to the US, domestic common shocks within Canada (stemming, for instance, from movements in the Canadian 4 See also Owyang and Wall (2004) for analysis of US regional responses to monetary policy. Their analysis is also performed at the overall industry level, with ex post reference to industrial structure differences. 5 We share Beine and Coulombe's aim of comparing cycles in a country that may join a currency union with those in a larger one. We differ in that we treat the small country as one region and the large country as a number of regions that already share a currency union; their analysis treats the large entity as one region and divides the smaller one into a number of regions. To separate trend from cyclical employment, we filter each regional industry employment series using an HP filter (with λ=1600). The "employment gap" or cycle series for each regional industry is calculated as seasonally adjusted 6 Australian and New Zealand employment data are obtained from Australian Bureau of Statistics and Statistics New Zealand respectively. The data are described in more detail in Grimes (2004) . 7 I.e. Community/Social/Personal Services; many of which are provided or funded by government. 8 Including Accommodation, Cafes, Restaurants employment as a ratio of trend employment. The mean of the employment gap for each series is almost exactly unity.
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We denote employment gap series as G i,j where the prefix, G, represents the employment gap (i.e. the cycle), i is the region identifier, and j indicates the industry; for instance, G TAS,AFF is Tasmania's employment gap in the agriculture sector. For each region, the overall employment gap, G i,TOT , is derived from the sum of trend employment and the sum of actual employment across the nine industries. For each industry, the Australasian employment gap, G ANZ,j , is derived from the sum of actual employment and the sum of trend employment across the nine regions.
Aggregate employment gaps for each region other than NT 10 are shown in Figure 1 . The NZ employment gap is highlighted; the remaining lines represent the other eight regions. We present the information in this manner since the primary question driving our analysis is whether NZ is an appropriate candidate to join a currency union to which the other regions already belong. As regions become larger, they tend to become more diversified and so cycles have smaller amplitude. The ANZ employment gap has a standard deviation of 1.2%. Apart from VIC, all the larger regions' cycles (including NZ) have standard deviations of 1.4%-1.5%; TAS and ACT are at 1.7%-1.8%, and NT is at 4.0%. VIC is unusual in having a cycle amplitude (1.9%) akin to that of TAS and ACT. 9 We also computed a Baxter-King (BK) band-pass filtered gap (assuming a cycle length of between 1.5 and 8 years) and compared it to the HP filtered gap on the overall Australasian series. The correlation coefficient between the two cycle measures is 0.990. Given these almost identical measures, we restrict ourselves solely to consideration of the HP filtered series. 10 NT is omitted since the amplitude of its cycle is much larger than for the other regions. For clarity, the employment gaps are presented as (G i,j -1)*100 rather than G i,j . While the NZ cycle's standard deviation is similar to those of NSW, QLD, SA and WA, its pattern over 1985-1991 differs from that in any other region.
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This period coincided with the major microeconomic and macroeconomic reforms undertaken within New Zealand beginning in 1984 and culminating in 1991 (Evans et al, 1996) . The reforms initially had a positive economic impact as the financial sector was deregulated. However, negative balance sheet effects following the October 1987 sharemarket fall, and the effects of fiscal tightening and a labour-market "shake-out" after privatization and commercialization of government enterprises, led to a sharp fall in employment in the late-1980s. After 1991, the NZ employment gap mirrors that of most other regions, other than a greater fall following the Asian financial crisis, coinciding with a major drought in NZ (Buckle et al, 2003) . For these reasons, where our 11 Bjorksten et al (2004) noted strong similarities between the NZ and Australian regional cycles across their sample, but that sample only started in 1992. ACT and NT cannot be considered as core regions in cyclical terms.
Correlation & Transmission of Regional & Industry Cycles
In examining the transmission of cycles across regions and across industries, we initially follow Kouparitsas's (2002) approach examining contemporaneous and lead/lag correlations between regional employment gaps at the overall industry level (G i,TOT ). (Kouparitsas, 2002) . Each figure is compared with the corresponding figure in Table 3 (or 5). Where the figure exceeds the relevant figure in Table 3 (or 5), the implication is that the cycle of the region listed vertically leads the cycle of the region listed horizontally. For instance, the full sample contemporaneous correlation of ACT and TAS is 0.31 whereas the correlation of ACT in time t with TAS in time t+1 is 0.42. The implication is that ACT's cycle leads that of TAS. In Table 4 (and 6),
we note in bold any figure that exceeds its corresponding entry in Table 3 (and 5) . 12 The figure is the square root of the R 2 in an equation regressing a region's employment gap on its own lag plus a constant (note that it is not the coefficient on the lag). employees over the sample (as did NSW, although this is largely due to its overall size; its mining share was lower than the ANZ average). The next largest mining region averaged fewer than 6,000 employees. This evidence indicates a prima facie case for investigating the importance of mining shocks in determining the cycles of these particular regions and thence influencing other regions.
The key distinguishing feature of ACT is that it contains Australia's capital city (Canberra) and little else. Its average employment share involved in OTS (largely government-related services) was 50% compared with 26% for ANZ. The leading nature of ACT relative to other regions may represent a fiscal shock that registers first in ACT and then spreads outwards to other regions. Tables 7 and 8 The regional results lead to some hypotheses regarding the effects of sectoral shocks on regional and ANZ cyclical outcomes. In particular, we hypothesize that shocks to MIN, OTS and possibly AFF cause regional and ANZwide cycles. We can test whether this is the case using Granger causality tests for the impact of Australasian industry cycles on each of the regional cycles. Tables 9 and 10 present the test results, using one and two lags respectively.
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13 When the NZ tests are run over the full sample, the only significant test result with one lag is QLD causing NZ (at 5%); the only significant result with two lags is VIC causing NZ (at 10%). In no case does NZ cause any other region or ANZ. 14 The exception in the latter case is that QLD does not Granger-cause ANZ with two lags. 15 The tests for NZ are again run over 1991(4)-2002(4); other samples begin in 1985(4). The only other sector to Granger-cause ANZ under both lag structures is OTS (possibly reflecting a fiscal shock). MIN does not Granger-cause any region or ANZ under either lag structure. We return to this paradoxical result below.
We gain more insight into the role of certain industries in causing regional cycles using Granger causality tests between industries. Tables 11 and 12 present the industry analogues of Tables 7 and 8 . Three industries -CON, MAN
and OTS -are found to Granger-cause the total economy at the 5% level (with both 1 and 2 lags). CON and MAN each lead several sectors. OTS is not found to lead any specific sector; its effect is discernable in the aggregate only, consistent with the effects of a pervasive fiscal shock. The primary industries -AFF and MIN -are notable for their lack of influence on other sectors. paradox. The first is that the link between mining intensity and the leading regions is purely coincidental; some other feature associated with those regions may be at play.
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The second is that mining is a major source of the regional shock but the Granger causality tests do not pick up this influence. 16 Mining cycles are driven predominantly by two factors: world prices of minerals and new discoveries of mineral deposits. Neither of these are likely to be caused in an economic sense (as opposed to a temporal, or Granger causality, sense) by other sectoral cycles within
Australasia. Yet both Tables 11 and 12 show MIN to be Granger-caused by CON (at the 1% level in each case) and by MAN (at 5% and 10% with 1 lag and 2 lags respectively). An explanation is that a mining expansion must be preceded by considerable construction work prior to the mine opening (or expanding). Thus we would observe MIN being led in a temporal sense by CON (and possibly also by manufacturing via manufacturing sub-sectors that service the mining industry).
However, in an economic sense, it is the mining shock that causes CON (and MAN). If this explanation holds, and if mining shocks are large enough to influence the aggregate economy, we would observe CON in mining states leading both MIN in those states and leading the aggregate ANZ cycle. We would also observe future MIN (in period t+s) "leading" the aggregate cycle (in period t) reflecting the "s" quarters that it takes to gear up mining employment following the shock to the industry.
We examine Granger causality tests (with 2 lags) between CON in each region and ANZ total industry cycles; the results are consistent with this explanation. Construction in each of WA and QLD lead the ANZ cycle (at the 1% level); only one other region (VIC) has its regional construction cycle leading the ANZ cycle (also at 1%; no other regions are significant at 10%).
We test for Granger-causality from G ANZ,MIN, t+s to G ANZ,TOT, t for each of s = -4, …, 0, …, +4, and find a pattern consistent with this explanation. In each case (retaining 2 lags in the test) where s = 0, …, -4, the combined coefficient on G ANZ,MIN in the Granger-causality test is negative. Where s = +1, … +4, the combined coefficient is positive; in three of these cases the coefficients are jointly significant at the 5% level and in the other case, at the 10% level (longer lags are not significantly different from zero).
While we cannot be conclusive that mining is a significant source of shocks in Australasia, the tests are consistent with this hypothesis. Shocks to government-related services (OTS) also appear important in generating cycles in the aggregate Australasian economy. Manufacturing shocks and shocks to construction (to the extent that these shocks are independent of shocks to other sectors) may also play a role.
Cyclical Interactions with the Exchange Rate
Since 1991, the New Zealand economic cycle has generally been as closely correlated with the cycle in the larger Australian regions as those regions are with each other. However the causality tests in Tables 7 and 8 Australia's mining employment has averaged only 0.7% of its total employment, and has averaged just 0.06% of overall Australian employment over the sample.
Further, the coefficient on G SA,MIN in the test is positive. If taken at face value, this result would suggest that the AUD depreciates relative to the NZD when there is a positive shock to MIN in Australia. 20 Over the shorter sample, the significance level of this variable drops to 9.7% with one lag, and to 24% with two lags. We therefore discount the relevance of this result.
Over the shortened sample, the three Australian AFF cycles (for NSW, TAS and AUS) no longer Granger-cause NZDAUD at the 10% level (using each of one and two lags in the test). This suggests that the Australian AFF effects may 19 The two countries are separated by a 2,000 kilometre stretch of ocean. 20 The correlation coefficient between G SA,MIN and G AUS,MIN is positive (0.21).
not be robust. 21 The New Zealand OTS effect also is no longer significant over the Granger-causes NZDAUD (at the 1% level), NZDAUD does not Granger-cause G NZ,TOT at even the 20% level. Thus the causality is in one direction only. 21 Alternatively, it may be that their key effect was early in the sample. However, the variation in each of G AUS,AFF and G NSW,AFF was greater in the latter part of the sample than the earlier part of the sample, so if their effect on NZDAUD was robust, they should have maintained their significance over the shorter sample. Another potential explanation of this finding is that the NZDAUD (the New Zealand -Australia cross exchange rate) has played a buffering role in response to Australian sourced shocks that has insulated the NZ cycle from Australian shocks. Our disaggregation of the available regional data into regional industry cycles is particularly useful in testing this hypothesis. We have analyzed which regional industry cycles have had a causal influence on (the floating) NZDAUD since 1985(4). By far the strongest regional industry impacts on the NZDAUD stem from the overall NZ cycle, and from the NZ manufacturing cycle. These effects are robust over different sample periods and different specifications of the Granger causality test. In addition, there is some weak evidence that NZ fiscal shocks have impacted on the NZDAUD, particularly earlier in the sample.
There is some weak evidence also that Australian agriculture shocks (particularly in NSW and, to a lesser extent, in Tasmania) have had some impact on the NZDAUD, again mainly earlier in the sample period. There is no evidence of other Australian industries or regions impacting on the cross rate. In particular,
Australian mining booms do not appear to have had any material impact on the NZDAUD.
An often voiced concern in New Zealand regarding potential common currency with Australia is that New Zealand would lose the ability to adjust to Australian mineral booms through exchange rate adjustment. While in theory this is correct, the evidence over the floating rate period suggests that the NZDAUD has not played this role in practice, even though the NZD has been floating independently of the AUD. Thus loss of monetary sovereignty in this respect may not be of major consequence. Further, the lack of NZDAUD adjustment to Australian AFF shocks in the post-1991 period suggests that again there may not be a material loss of flexibility in response to an Australian drought or other Australian-sourced agriculture shock.
The evidence instead suggests that a more important loss of monetary sovereignty may arise through the loss of exchange rate flexibility consequent on a New Zealand-specific shock, especially one that hits the manufacturing sector.
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It is these types of shocks that the NZDAUD has been most responsive to since it was floated in 1985. The exchange rate response has generally been in an equilibrating direction for the economy, with an NZDAUD appreciation as the 22 Examples might include domestic fiscal shocks, climatic shocks and terms of trade shocks affecting products for which NZ has a much stronger exposure than does Australia. (NZ manufacturing has a high food processing content so climatic and terms of trade shocks can impinge materially on the MAN cycle.) economy overheats. If these cycles could be dampened, this role for NZD flexibility would be diminished. If, however, these cycles cannot be materially dampened, then the establishment of a common currency could create a macroeconomic cost for New Zealand. Whether this cost is outweighed by the microeconomic benefits cannot be ascertained from the current analysis.
Nevertheless the results indicate that formation of a common currency is not a "win-win" situation. Instead, a trade-off between macroeconomic and microeconomic considerations would, most likely, be involved.
